Scott Shapiro, an exclusive legal positivist, argues that inclusive legal positivism is inconsistent with the claim that legal norms provide reasons for officials and citizens to act in specified ways.
Introduction
Legal positivism is the view that law has a fundamentally social nature. Legal positivists believe that law is a socially constructed human artifact that is the outcome of social processes such as winning the majority vote in the legislative branch. More specifically, the core commitment of legal positivism is the "Social Fact Thesis," which is the thesis that the existence of legal systems and legal rules is ultimately determined by certain facts about social groups.
One could ask if it is conceptually possible to include moral properties in the criteria of legality. For example, does the Due Process Clause specify a constitutional test of fairness requiring consistency with fairness to be one of the criteria for legal validity? Exclusive legal positivists answer in the negative; they claim it is conceptually impossible for there to be a legal system that includes moral criteria in the rule that determines which rules are legally valid. The rule that determines which rules are legally valid is known as the "rule of recognition." 1 They say that the United States' rule of recognition cannot specify fairness as a condition of legal validity. 2 Inclusive legal positivists, however, claim it is conceptually possible for there to be at least one legal system that includes moral criteria in the rule of recognition. They say that the United States' rule of recognition can specify fairness as a condition of legal validity via the Due Process Clause.
One might ask whether inclusive legal positivism is compatible with the Social Fact Thesis. Jules Coleman argues that inclusive legal positivism and the Social Fact Thesis are compatible. 3 The Social Fact Thesis, he claims, is consistent with the possibility that moral rules can be legal rules as long as the ultimate validity of the moral rule stems from a conventional rule-that is, the rule of recognition. Coleman's view, therefore, includes the "Conventionality Thesis," which is the thesis that every legal system contains a conventional rule that imposes a duty on courts to evaluate conduct in light of rules that bear certain characteristics. 4 One leading exclusive legal positivist, Scott Shapiro, 5 argues that an inclusive rule of recognition cannot validate moral rules that make a practical difference in the reasoning of agents. The Practical Difference Thesis, roughly, asserts that the law must make a difference in the reasoning of agents both conceptually and practically. One way that the law must make a practical difference is by guiding conduct and deliberation. For example, the law must be capable of informing citizens of the content of their legal duties or create a reason for citizens to follow their legal duties. Shapiro's view is that moral rules validated by an inclusive rule of recognition cannot give any such guidance. He then argues that the three theses-Inclusive Legal Positivism, the Conventionality Thesis, and the Practical Difference Thesis-form an inconsistent triad. Shapiro's challenge is that one of these three theses must be given up, and
Shapiro suggests that inclusive legal positivism should be given up for exclusive legal positivism.
Inclusive legal positivists answer Shapiro's challenge in a variety of ways. 6 Some say that it only matters that some legal rules are capable of making a practical difference, and it does not matter that every legal rule is thus capable. 7 However, Shapiro argues that being capable of making a practical difference is a necessary condition for the existence of every particular legal rule. What I intend to show is that moral rules are capable of making a practical difference qua legal rule even if we assume that a rule must be capable of guiding conduct in order to count as a legal rule.
Overview of Shapiro's challenge
Shapiro's main target is H.L.A. Hart. For Hart, the function of law is the guidance of conduct. 8 Shapiro argues that the law guides conduct by giving either epistemic or motivational guidance. According to Shapiro, epistemic guidance means that for the agent the "rule was the source of information regarding what counts as conformity." 9 The rule yield to pedestrians at crosswalks epistemically guides Elmo when he gleans his legal duty from the rule. An agent is motivationally guided by a legal rule when an agent takes the fact that the rule regulates the conduct in question as a reason to perform that act. Elmo is motivationally guided by his legal duty to yield to pedestrians at crosswalks when the rule creates a reason for Elmo to conform.
Shapiro then unpacks how the law must make a practical difference with the following three claims:
A. Primary rules must epistemically guide judges (who are at the same time guided by the rule of recognition).
B. Primary rules must motivationally guide judges (who are at the same time guided by the rule of recognition). C. Primary rules must epistemically guide citizens (directly or indirectly).
According to Shapiro, for legal rules to have a guidance function, the legal rule must be capable of either motivational or epistemic guidance. Thus, it is necessary that legal officials be either epistemically or motivationally guided by a legal rule. But it is not necessary that citizens be motivationally guided by legal rules because it is not clear that the law must care why a citizen follows a legal rule: it only matters that the citizen follows it (e.g., perhaps she follows rules because she fears legal sanctions). Thus, it is minimally necessary that ordinary citizens be epistemically guided by a legal rule.
Shapiro then gives two sets of arguments that are straightforward reductios against inclusive legal positivism, to which I will return. In each argument, Shapiro argues that moral rules validated by an inclusive rule of recognition can neither epistemically nor motivationally guide any agent of a legal system. Thus, moral rules validated by an inclusive rule of recognition cannot be action guiding in the manner in which legal rules are supposed to be action guiding. And since legal rules must be capable of making a practical difference-namely, by providing citizens with either epistemic or motivational guidance-in order to count as legal rules, moral rules cannot be legal rules. Again, for Shapiro, if a rule is incapable of making a practical difference, then it is not a legal rule. Moreover, if a rule makes a difference in any way other than guiding conduct and deliberation, then it is not making a practical difference qua legal rule.
There are three requirements that Shapiro must establish before we can confidently conclude that moral rules cannot be legal rules. Each of the three requirements entails that moral rules cannot be action guiding in the manner which legal rules are action guiding.
R1. Moral rules cannot be content independent reasons for acting.
R2. Moral rules cannot be intended to be peremptory reasons for acting.
R3. Moral rules cannot be dynamic in the same manner that legal rules that pass Shapiro's counterfactual test are dynamic-that is, counterfactually, L might not have been legally valid at time t.
I will argue that Shapiro fails to meet the requirements of his own challenge by showing that statements R1-R3 are false. I turn Shapiro's reductio back onto him with the following argument (Let "Inclusive Legal Positivism" be ILP, the "Practical Difference Thesis" be PDT, and the "Conventionality Thesis" be CT):
Therefore, (ILP & PDT & CT)
I will now defend the claim that moral rules are capable of guiding conduct qua legal rule.
Controversy over content-independent reasons for acting
Shapiro argues that, for Hart, legal rules are able to guide conduct because agents treat them as "content-independent" and "peremptory" reasons for acting. 10 Shapiro's definition of content independent reasons is the following:
A valid rule is a "content-independent" reason for action-it gives an agent a reason to comply irrespective of whether the agent has reasons to act on its content. The fact that the rule requires that an act be done is, by itself, a reason to perform the act.
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Shapiro understands content-independent reasons (hereafter content-independent SS ) as reasons to act whose force is independent of the merit of their content. Thus, on Shapiro's reading, Bert acts on a content-independent SS reason when he follows the law because it is the law rather than following it because the law tells Bert to do something that is good.
In this debate, moral rules are usually understood as reasons for acting because their content has substantive moral merit. Thus, the force of moral rules qua reasons for acting derives from the substantive merit of their content. If "helping people in poverty-stricken nations" is a moral rule, its normative force derives from the merit of helping people in povertystricken nations. Moral rules cannot be content-independent SS reasons for acting because their force derives from the merit of their content. Since legal rules are content-independent SS reasons for acting, according to Shapiro, moral rules cannot guide conduct qua legal rule.
My view is that Shapiro cannot demonstrate the first requirement of his argument: Moral rules cannot be content-independent reasons for acting. I give three reasons. First, I show that Shapiro's exposition of Hart's treatment of content-independent reasons is wrong. Second, I
argue that the normative force of legal rules qua reasons for acting is better explained by Hart's conception of content-independent reasons. Third, I show that Shapiro must be committed to
Hart's conception of content-independent reasons to explain the normativity of legal rules.
Consider the following quote from Hart:
[When giving content independent reasons,] the commander intends his expression of intention to be taken as a reason for doing them. It is therefore intended to function as a reason independently of the nature or character of the actions to be done.
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In other words, In a case in which A issues a command to P to ϕ, P has a contentindependent reason to ϕ only if A intends her expression that P ϕ to be a reason for P to ϕ.
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12 Hart, EB, [254] [255] Stefan Sciaraffa is the first to offer an intention-based reading, a reading that uses the intention of another as a condition to having a content-independent reason for acting, of Hart's account of content independent reasons. In addition, Sciaraffa demonstrates the pervasiveness with which most legal theorists misread Hart's account. See On this reading of content-independent reasons (hereafter called content-independent IB reasons), 16 At one point, he says, "directives are intended to be content-independent reasons for action, meaning that they are supposed to be reasons simply because they have been issued and not because they direct subjects to perform actions that are independently justifiable," Shapiro, "Authority," 389, emphasis given by me. Concerning legal rules, he says, "the fact that the rule requires the act be done is, by itself, a reason to perform that act." Between the two claims, we could say that a likely candidate for the property F-ness is that it is the property of telling people what to do. However, Shapiro also thinks requests are content-independent reasons for acting, and requests do not tell people what to do, but rather they ask people to do something. 17 Hart, EB, 244, 251. 18 Hart cites the very same article that I quote Scaiaraffa as explaining in footnote 2. Scaiaraffa explains, "Grice's analysis of non-natural meaning is as follows: 'A meant NN something by x" is (roughly) equivalent to 'A intended the utterance of x to produce some effect in an audience by means of the recognition of this intention," Grice, role of intention in imperatives, which Shapiro, too, fails to adequately explain. Thus, Hart asserts that an analysis of imperatives that does not mention anything about intention is defective; Shapiro's explanation of content-independent reasons is one such analysis. 19 The following quote from Hart supports an intention-based reading of content-independent reasons:
Bentham was therefore right in thinking that it is part of commanding and the other imperative speech acts which characteristically make use of the imperative mood that the speaker intends his hearer in some way to recognize his wish that he should do the act. Where he went wrong was in not seeing or at any rate in not making clear … that strictly what the commander intends his hearer to recognize is not that he, the commander, merely wishes the act to be done but more specifically that his intention in speaking is to get the hearer to do it through the latter's recognition that the commander has spoken with that intention. In other words, the commander intends his hearer to recognize the giving of a command as a step intentionally taken towards furthering the commander's intention to get his hearer to act.
When someone offers a content-independent IB reason, she intends her expression that P ϕ to be a reason for P to ϕ. But one might argue that P's having a content-independent reason is not a matter of anyone intending since intention is not a necessary condition to have a reason for acting. 20 For example, Ernie leaves the stove on before taking a nap and, while napping, murmurs aloud, "Turn off the stove!" Bert walks in and overhears Ernie's utterances. One might argue that Bert has a reason to turn off the stove even though Ernie did not intend for Bert to turn off the stove.
Nevertheless, it is doubtful that we should draw any theory-challenging inferences from our intuitive response to the counterexample above. It is asking whether Bert has a reason at all to turn off the stove; notwithstanding, Ernie's lack of intention that Bert turn off the stove.
However, Bert can have a reason to turn off the stove that is explained by another account of reasons. For example, Bert could have a prudential reason to turn off the stove. This explanation for why Bert should turn off the stove is compatible with the intention-based view of content-independent reasons. The view is only claiming that when someone tells P to ϕ, she intends her expression to be a reason for P to ϕ.
Reason 2: Shapiro's conception of content-independent reasons cannot explain that legal rules are normative reasons for acting without begging the question.
We have two competing conceptions of content-independent reasons: contentindependent SS and content-independent IB . Shapiro thinks that his conception of contentindependent reasons is more consistent with the structure for which legal rules are normative reasons for acting. Again, content-independent SS reasons for acting give an agent a reason to comply irrespective of whether the agent has reasons to act on its content. The normative force of content-independent SS reasons is explained by the type of reason it is. For example, promises are usually understood as content-independent SS reasons for acting because one has a reason to keep one's promises irrespective of the merit of the content of the promise. If Elmo promises Big Bird that he will stop lighting kittens on fire, then Elmo has a reason to keep his promise because Elmo has promised, not because refraining from lighting kittens on fire is a good thing to do. Similarly, requests are usually understood as content-independent SS reasons for acting.
Bert requests that Ernie check to see if Ernie has left the stove on before Ernie goes to sleep.
Bert's request gives Ernie a reason to act that is independent of considerations like Ernie's forgetfulness when it comes to turning off the stove after cooking. It is the fact that Bert asked, rather than what Bert asked, which gives Ernie a reason to act. 21 Shapiro thinks that the normative force of legal rules operates in the same manner. Agents who are committed to legal rules, according to Shapiro, "conform simply because the rule regulates the action in question," 
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To be sure, Shapiro's analysis does have some phenomenological appeal. When I think about why I do not violate copyright laws, I conform merely because it is the law and not because there is any merit in conforming (perhaps violating copyright laws is convenient for reading groups and could thereby facilitate learning). But having phenomenological appeal will not help Shapiro. Equally plausible is that I conform to copyright laws because it is the intention of the members in the United States' legislature branch that I conform to copyright laws.
Furthermore, Shapiro's explanation of content-independent SS reasons means that the normative force of legal rules being reasons for acting is "agent-neutral" because the explanation requires all people to follow legal rules irrespective of the action the legal rule requires. 24 A value is agent-neutral if there are reasons not only for A to fulfill them but also for B, C, D, 21 Shapiro worded his description of requests in this manner, but I changed the names in the example. See Shapiro, "On Hart's Way Out," 175. etcetera; it is a valuable activity that is in principle everybody's business. 25 It is in principle everybody's business to follow legal rules simpliciter simply because of the type of object a legal rule is-namely, a rule that regulates his and her actions.
One might object that content-independent SS reasons could be understood as agentrelative; however, my point is that Shapiro's argument requires content-independent SS reasons to be understood as agent-neutral because it is a requirement of his argument that contentindependent SS reasons require all agents to conform to the rule irrespective of its content in order to conclude that moral rules are incapable of guiding anyone qua legal rule.
Moreover, Shapiro cannot explain the normativity of legal rules from his conceptual analysis of what legal rules are without begging the question. He must give a separate answer to explain why legal rules are normative reasons for acting. Afterwards, Shapiro can then explain that legal rules are content-independent SS reasons for acting.
Analogously, philosophers must explain why agents should keep promises before they can explain which kind of reason a promise is. For example, a rule utilitarian might claim that promises should be kept because this rule if generally followed would increase overall utility more than any alternative rule regarding promise-keeping. 26 This explanation supports a reading of keeping-promises as content-independent SS reasons for acting because, according to rule utilitarians, instead of being utility calculators every time one faces the decision of whether to keep a promise or not, people ought to perform the action necessary to keep the promise irrespective of what the action might be.
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But Scanlon provides a defense of promise-keeping according to which promises ought to be kept because of the "principle of fidelity," a principle he claims no one could reasonably reject. 28 Essentially, the principle of fidelity requires that the promisor keep her promise because the promisor has given the promisee the expectation and the assurance of her intention that she will fulfill the promise. Thus, the promisee has the expectation that the promisor will perform the action that keeps the promise. And, unless the promisee releases the promisor from the promise, the promisee expects the promisor to perform the action that keeps the promise. One interpretation of Scanlon's defense of promise-keeping supports a reading of promises as content-independent IB reasons for acting because, on this reading, in any particular case, the fact that A tells P "I promise to ϕ" means that P has a content-independent IB reason to act on the basis of the promise. 29 If Elmo has promised Big Bird that he will stop lighting kittens on fire, and Big Bird asserts, "Elmo, do not light anymore kittens chicks on fire," then Big Bird has not released Elmo from his promise and intends his expression to be a reason for Elmo to refrain from lighting kittens on fire. In these cases, the truth of the principle of fidelity and the fact that the promisee expects the promisor to ϕ are enabling conditions for the promisor to ϕ.
The point is that legal theorists, nearly unanimously, think that promises are contentindependent SS for acting, but they think so without explaining why promises are normative
Even if the valuable state of affairs essentially includes an action, its value is independent of being the agent's action-of being his. For example, if S's keeping his promise is intrinsically valuable, it is so independently of its being his keeping of his promise," Darwall, "Agent-Centered Restrictions Inside and Out," Philosophical Studies 50, no. 3 (1986): 293. 28 Scanlon's Principle F is the following: If (1) A voluntarily and intentionally leads B to expect that A will do X (unless B consents to A's not doing so); (2) A knows that B wants to be assured of this; (3) A acts with the aim of providing this assurance, and has good reason to believe that he or she has done so; (4) B knows that A has the beliefs and intentions just described; (5) A intends for B to know this, and knows that B does know it; and (6) B knows that A has this knowledge and intent; then, in the absence of special justification, A must do X unless B consents to X's not being done. reasons for acting. But these theorists have merely begged the question because different answers to why we should keep our promises support different readings of content-independent reasons for acting. Analogously, a theorist must explain why legal rules are normative reasons for acting to appropriately defend which conception of content-independent reasons for acting is correct. I will defend a voluntarist view to explain the structure of normativity of legal rules.
Moreover, I argue that Shapiro is committed to the voluntarist view. My point in presenting these cases is to show that there are certain end-states that operative members of state-officials and citizens-desire or value, and they achieve those end-states through illocutionary acts.
All legal rules are speech acts with propositional content. However, illocutionary acts with the same propositional content can obtain distinct results with differing illocutionary force.
For example, cheering that you pay your taxes on time is distinct from predicting that you will pay your taxes on time, demanding that you pay your taxes on time, and begging that you pay your taxes on time, and so on. Identifying the illocutionary point of illocutionary acts is the most fundamental way to distinguish different illocutionary forces. The illocutionary point is the goal internal to the type of illocutionary act it is. For example, Mark Murphy asserts, "the point internal to the laying down of demands is to present an act as to-be-done. Shapiro is committed to the reading of content-independent reasons qua content-independent IB .
And if Shapiro is committed the reading of content-independent reasons qua contentindependent IB , and I can adequately demonstrate that moral rules can be content-independent IB reasons for acting, then it is conceptually impossible for Shapiro to demonstrate that moral rules 41 Murphy, Natural Law in Jurisprudence and Politics, 45. cannot be content-independent reasons. I contend that moral rules can be content-independent IB reasons for acting in the following respect.
In summary, with the proper understanding of content-independent reasons, moral principles can be content-independent reasons for acting. Judges can cite moral principles as contentindependent reasons IB for acting simply because the judge intends the participants to conform to moral principles. It matters not what the actual content of the judge's command is, only that the judge intends the participants to take her ruling as a reason to act. Thus, I conclude that Shapiro fails to demonstrate the first major requirement of challenge: Moral rules cannot be contentindependent reasons for acting.
Peremptory reasons for acting
While I find fault with Shapiro's view of content-independent reasons, I assume that his exposition of "peremptory reasons" for acting is correct. 42 In addition, Shapiro makes another set of costly expositional mistakes concerning Hart's treatment of the relation between content-independent and peremptory reasons for acting. Consider Hart's discussion on practical authority: "For to have such [practical] authority is to have one's expression of intention as to the actions of others accepted as peremptory content-independent reasons for action," Hart, EB, 253. Shapiro's account requires both features to be coordinate adjectives in order to contrast them singly to the "incompatible" features of moral rules, but Hart constructed the sentence with "peremptory" and "content-independent" as cumulative adjectives. For cumulative adjectives, the adjective "content-independent" modifies the noun "reasons for action," and the adjective "peremptory" modifies "content-independent reasons for action." Thus, from the manner in which Hart constructs the sentence, it should be read as the following: peremptory content-independent reasons for acting are reasons that are intended to cutoff independent deliberation by the agent.
With the correct understanding of the relationship between content-independent and peremptory reasons for acting, moral rules can be intended to be peremptory reasons for acting. Thus, even if content-independent reasons were intention-based, peremptory reasons for acting cut off all deliberation. Shapiro might then claim that when judges deliberate about the content of rules, they are neither epistemically nor motivationally guided by the moral content.
Furthermore, judges must deliberate about moral rules to figure out which rule is morally appropriate in hard cases (e.g., judges must deliberate to determine whether a rule upholds a standard of justice or fairness). In summary, the objection is that even if I could explain that ordinary citizens could be epistemically guided by moral rules qua legal rule, I cannot explain that judges can be either epistemically or motivationally guided by moral rules qua legal rule. 48 Here is a quote from Shapiro: "According to our first argument, however, we know that such rules cannot epistemically guide judges in adjudication. Inclusive rules of recognition do not tell judges which moral rules they should apply-they simply tell judges to apply moral rules. These rules cannot give epistemic guidance because judges are left to figure out for themselves what these rules are. Vis-à-vis such rules, they are like ordinary citizens. I am not sure, however, whether Hart need be concerned with this result either" (Shapiro, "On Hart's Way Out," 178). 49 Shapiro, "On Hart's Way Out," 173. 50 Shapiro, "Law, Morality, and the Guidance of Conduct," 163. First, we should be clear on what the terms "to accept" and "to treat" mean. Given that a rule is roughly of the form "X ought to ϕ in circumstances C," 54 to accept a rule is to make a cognitive appraisal that "X ought to ϕ in circumstances C." And to treat something in a certain way is closer to a characterization of how an agent behaved in a specified manner towards something, or, to put it more generally, how an agent did act. Thus, I claim that to accept is closer to making a judgment, and to treat is closer to doing an action. And not to misrepresent Shapiro, the action that he is concerned with is treating a rule as a peremptory reason for action. Now, both Shapiro and I claim that there is a conceptual connection between the will and the component that we think is more basic and phenomenologically closer to explaining motivation. I claim there is a conceptual connection between making a judgment that one ought to ϕ and the will. Furthermore, I contend that the conceptual connection between making a judgment that one ought to ϕ and the will is a defeasible one in order to account for akrasia.
Akrasia is the state of mind in which someone acts against his or her better judgment through weakness of the will. For example, suppose Cookie Monster judges that he should not eat cookies. On the occasions that he does eat cookies, he is just being akratic, but he still believes that he has a reason not to eat cookies. The conceptual connection is represented as follows: If an agent judges that she ought to ϕ in circumstances C, then either she is motivated to ϕ in C or is she is practically irrational.
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Shapiro claims there is a conceptual connection between doing an action-in particular, not deliberating-and the will. The conceptual connection can be represented as follows: If an agent does not deliberate that she ought to ϕ in circumstances C, then she is motivated to ϕ in C.
If the agent does deliberate, then she is not treating the rule as a peremptory reason for acting.
But Shapiro cannot claim that the conceptual connection between actions and motivation is a defeasible one. Shapiro has to claim that there is a necessary connection between not deliberating and the will since his argument requires the following two conditional statements to Shapiro to explain the shift in focus, when explaining guidance, to the fact that the rule regulates the action in question instead of continuing to focus on how legal rules affect the practical reasoning process of their agents. I will continue to focus on the Practical Difference Thesis and assert that guidance is central to how legal rules are intended to enter into and make a difference to the practical reasoning of its agents. And in any case, this whole debate is centered on an agent's practical reasoning. So why explain guidance in any other way? Consider my general formulation of motivational guidance: someone is motivationally guided by a rule when they accept the manner in which the legal rule is intended to be a reason for acting.
I offer the following three reasons for rejecting Shapiro's account of motivational guidance. First, both components-motivation and guidance-of Shapiro's account of motivational guidance are untenable. In contrast, my account of motivational guidance explains both components of motivational guidance better. Second, Shapiro's account has the implausible consequence that if a judge ever deliberates about a rule, then he can never be motivationally guided by that rule. However, it seems that certain things that agents were not motivationally guided by before can motivationally guide them later. Katie Holmes was adamantly opposed to Scientology at one point in her life, but after her marriage with Tom Cruise, she became an adamant supporter of Scientology. Conversely, my account does not have the implausible consequence that one can never be motivationally guided by a rule if they do not accept the rule as the kind of reason for acting that it was intended to be at some earlier time; perhaps at a later time they will accept the rule as a kind of reason for acting that it was intended to be. Thus, my account explains that changes in motivational guidance follows from a change in judgmentnamely, the agent accepts something that she once rejected before and vice versa.
I am finally ready to free Hart from Shapiro's charge of inconsistency with the appropriate conception of motivational guidance in place. It is the case that nothing conceptually precludes agents from accepting moral rules as peremptory reasons for acting from the start. For example, some people believe that kicking babies for fun is morally wrong, and they do not think one needs to deliberate in order to assess the moral appropriateness of that precept because they take the principle as a self-evident truth. Thus, they accept the moral rule as a peremptory reason for acting at the beginning. Furthermore, even assuming that Shapiro is right about his claim that judges must deliberate on every moral rule in order to assess its moral appropriateness, this assumption does not entail that they can never be motivationally guided by that rule if they deliberated about the content of the rule at some earlier time. Essentially, the counterfactual test amounts to the following: if agent P conforms to rule R regardless of whether P appeals to R in her practical reasoning, then R is not capable of making a practical difference for P because P would already have done R. For example, if there was a law mandating that aluminum cans had to be recycled, but I was a strict aluminum can recycler anyway, then, according to Shapiro's counterfactual test, that law is incapable of making a practical difference for me. Shapiro then explains that if it is possible that P would not have conformed to R, then R is capable of making a practical difference. Thus, if I was a not-so disciplined aluminum can recycler (I recycled cans only on occasion or not at all), then that law is capable of making a practical difference for me.
Shapiro then argues that someone cannot be guided by the inclusive rule of recognition and be simultaneously guided by moral rules validated by it. Shapiro gives the following argument to demonstrate that claim (let M be a moral rule that is validated by an inclusive rule of recognition):
(1) If P is guided by an inclusive rule of recognition, then P will be guided by M only if P might not have conformed to M if P had not appealed to M as a legal rule but continued to be guided by the inclusive rule of recognition. (2) Necessarily, if P is guided by an inclusive rule of recognition, then P conforms to M; (3) Therefore, if P is guided by an inclusive rule of recognition, then P will not be guided by M.
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Premise (1) is a restatement of the success conditions of Shapiro's counterfactual test as explained above. 60 And notice that Shapiro's conclusion (3) combined with the assumption that rules must be capable of making a practical difference in order to count as a legal rule entails that M cannot be a legal rule because it cannot make a practical difference. In addition, it is not clear that P must necessarily conform to M once P appeals to an inclusive rule of recognition merely because the inclusive rule of recognition has moral criteria and M is a moral rule. Thus, Shapiro
gives the following sub-argument for (2).
For Shapiro, it is a necessary truth that if P appeals to an inclusive rule of recognition, then P will conform to M. Shapiro argues that morality has a static nature and that the set of actions that morality is capable of motivating is fixed. Suppose that Elmo decides to follow the commands of his pastor who tells Elmo to do moral actions (which are those actions allowed or required in the Bible). Suppose further that Elmo consults the Bible, which dictates, "Thou shall not kill." Shapiro's argument claims that the contents of the Bible cannot further guide Elmo because once Elmo has decided to follow the commands of his pastor to do moral actions, then his pastor's command has picked out all moral actions including "Do not kill," which Elmo then necessarily conforms to. Shapiro is saying that once an action is morally right it is always morally right; furthermore, the inclusive rule of recognition will always regulate the same moral actions that moral rules validated by the inclusive rule of recognition regulate. 59 Shapiro, "Law, Morality, and the Guidance of Conduct," 138. 60 However, premise (1) uses two rules instead of just one (I used only one rule in my aluminum can example).
The counterfactual test coupled with the above sub-argument for (2) In the first sense, moral rules are static because when someone is motivationally guided by the inclusive rule of recognition, which says to do ϕ, she will ϕ; and since she will ϕ, she automatically conforms to M because M also says to ϕ. But, according to Shapiro, she ϕs because of the inclusive rule of recognition and not because of M. So she cannot be further motivationally guided by M. But I have given reasons to reject Shapiro's account of motivational guidance, which is, again, "someone is motivationally guided by a legal rule when 61 Shapiro, "Law, Morality, and the Guidance of Conduct," 139. Consider an inclusive rule of recognition that sets out distinct conditions of legality for characteristically non-moral legal rules, C, and moral principles, C1. This rule of recognition can be abbreviated as "C and C1." 65 For example, C could state the criterion, "Any rule with majority support in the judicial branch is a legal rule," and C1 could state the criterion, "Any rule that passes a constitutional test of fairness via the Due Process Clause is a legal rule."
Shapiro's argument is that C might not counterfactually obtain at t with respect to L while the truth conditions of C1 will always obtain with respect to M. Shapiro claims the truth conditions of C1 will always obtain with respect to M because whether the content of a moral rule is sufficiently moral will never change. If a rule passes a constitutional test of fairness via the Due Process Clause, then it will always be legally valid. But C1 does not always have to point out content characteristics of a moral rule-e.g., features of a rule that are true only in virtue of its content-because C1 can point out non-content characteristics of a moral rulefeatures of a rule that are true in virtue of social facts surrounding the rule. An example of a non-content characteristic that Coleman gives is that "C1 could state that a moral principle is a legal principle only if it is widely shared by members of the community." 66 I give the example that C1 could state that a moral rule is a legal rule only if the moral rule could be feasibly enforced without excessive financial cost. Moral rules about lying or prohibiting alcohol could not be practically enforced without a sufficiently large, dedicated police force.
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Here is my argument: if C1 could require criteria about the non-content characteristics of moral rules, then C1 will not always obtain with respect to M. That is, C1 might not counterfactually obtain at t with respect to M because the non-content characteristics of moral rules are contingent facts. It is not necessarily true that every moral rule is cited in legislative committee reports or has the ability to be practically enforced. But if C1 might not counterfactually obtain at t with respect to M, then M might not have been legally valid at t. And if that is the case, then moral rules can be dynamic in the same manner that legal rules that pass
Shapiro's counterfactual test are dynamic.
Shapiro could counter that C1 cannot pick out non-content characteristics of moral rules, but rather C1 must always pick out content characteristics of moral rules. That is, the inclusive rule of recognition could only have the kind of criterion that makes references to the rule's content, for example, whether or not the rule could pass a constitutional test of fairness. But no inclusive legal positivist has ever claimed that the rule of recognition must only pick out content characteristics of moral rules as criteria of legality. In fact, they claim the exact opposite.
Coleman's position is there are no constraints on the criteria of legality. Thus, for Coleman, the manner in which moral principles are legally valid could concern facts about its non-content characteristics. And if that is the case, then I claim that versions of inclusive legal positivism such as Coleman's can pass Shapiro's counterfactual test. Moreover, for reasons that I cannot 67 Moreover, the theorist who provoked this inclusive-exclusive debate, Ronald Dworkin, claims that moral principles need to be coupled with non-content characteristics. Dworkin asserts that, "unless we could find some such institutional support, we would probably fail to make out our case, and the more support we found, the more weight we could claim for the principle." 67 Thus, an example that Dworkin gives is that C1 could state that a moral principle is a legal principle if it is cited in legislative committee reports. See Dworkin, "Model of Rules I, " 40. argue for here, I have good reason to believe that versions of inclusive legal positivism other than Coleman's are, I believe, better situated than his for passing the counterfactual test.
Conclusion
Shapiro's charge of inconsistency is considered one of the major challenges to inclusive legal positivism. Shapiro's reductio against inclusive legal positivism is that moral rules validated by an inclusive rule of recognition can give neither epistemic nor motivational guidance to both judges and ordinary citizens. Thus, moral rules cannot be action guiding in the manner which legal rules are action guiding, and if being capable of making a practical difference is a necessary condition of legality, moral rules cannot be legal rules. I turned the reductio back onto Shapiro by arguing that moral rules can give neither epistemic nor motivational guidance only if the following statements are true: (i) moral rules cannot be content-independent reasons for acting, (ii) moral rules cannot be intended to be peremptory reasons for acting, and (iii) moral rules cannot be dynamic in the same manner which legal rules that pass Shapiro's counterfactual test are dynamic. I argue that since (i), (ii), and (iii) are false, moral rules can give both epistemic and motivational guidance to ordinary citizens and judges, respectively. Therefore, moral rules are capable of making a practical difference, and, most importantly, I can consistently hold the combination of ILP and the strong version of PDT.
Thus, I contend that Shapiro's charge of inconsistency fails.
